One of the more esoteric, and hence interesting, aspects of studying history is the study of historiography.
The Oxford degree curriculum essentially presents historiography as the history of history (or histories), and that was my initial impression of the term. But in retrospect I think that a better description of historiography is the
philosophy of history.
Because in dealing with the way history is written we ultimately base our analyses on the metaphysics of recording and systematizing the past into coherence.
Because ultimately one comes back to that all-consuming question: What is History?
And there are so many answers to this question, so many different theories attempting to define 'history'.
Take for example the crisis of
Historismus, the German school of history. It was originally conceived by the Germans that all history should consist entirely and exclusively of the entirety of objective facts of reality, of events as they actually happened, as opposed to how they were perceived to happen by biased and prejudiced human actors.
The problem with this was threefold and rapidly became manifestly obvious.
First, if history is composed of
all the facts of time, then we end up with an infinity of datum. A datum which is
impossible to fully compile. Real history therefore cannot exclude any, not even one, record of fact, from the history of the first molecules to the history of the first caveman and the history of the first fishing rod and how it was actually used. As long as an historical account has neglected to include even the history of the smallest dust-mite, it is not truly history. According to the definition laid down by the German school, therefore, there has never been nor ever will be a true history as it is simply not possible to accrue all the infinite facts of reality under one record. There is thus no point in writing history that matches the standards of the German school. One would be better off trying to numerate all the hydrogen atoms in the universe.
Second, such true history is also impossible to achieve because no truly objective record of the past has ever or can ever be written*. The writing of history is itself inevitably subjected to the perceptions of those who write history. No historian can ever claim to have the complete objectivity demanded by the German school when writing history. No human being exists
in vacuo, each and every one is informed and influenced by his or her experiences, emotions, languages, religious/moral creed and millions of other existential variables. Yet as long as there is the slighest iota of subjective judgement in a historical account, that account has to be rejected on the grounds that it is un-historical, even anti-historical. Again, the impossibility. Much as the cult of objectivity has gained an incredible level of credence in today's modern, 'professionalised' style of historical writing, it remains a sad truth that such eunuch-like objectivity** will never be attained, no matter how hard historians try. Total objectivity, whatever its considerable merits, is totally impossible to achieve. Again, there can be no writing of history, according to the standards of the German school.
Finally, such 'total history' in this sense lacks any meaning. The mere compilation of cold, hard, real facts means that all these facts are treated with equal importance. The only determinant of historical value is therefore physical veracity. And so the fact that caveman Ungaa-wangaa scratched his arse on the 11th of September is of the
same historical significance as the fact that terrorists attacked New York city exactly 5,000 years later. There is thus no relative significance at all in true history; it is deprived of importance in its
equal treatment of
all the facts. There is thus neither order nor system, nor rhyme, nor rhythm, in this vast collection of facts. In attempting to curb the worst excesses of normative valuations, the German school repudiated positive value systems as well, and thence any sense of proportion or meaning. It essentially threw the baby out along with the bath-water.
Fascinating. Now that is historiography. That multitude of answers to that question, 'What is History?'
Although the account of
Historismus presented here is of course not entirely accurate and suffers from those flaws necessitated by time and space constraints, I should think it provides enough to chew on mentally for quite some time. As indeed I myself am doing now instead of writing that essay on Cardinal Richelieu.
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*Sure, you can write 'simple' chronologies which just note what happened. E.g.: 'King X decreed that the tax should be raised to 10%'. Simple, clean, and easy as breakfast.
But some- in fact, most- events cannot be written in a way totally free of judgement.
Going back to the given example- why 'King X
decreed that the tax should be raised to 10%'? Why not 'King X
dictated that the tax should be raised to 10%'? Why not 'King X
demanded that the tax...'? (It becomes obvious that each of these words carries widely divergent meanings- the King who
decrees is associated with legitimacy, the King who
dictates is probably a tyrant, the King who
demands bears a hint of desperation if not exasperation about him.)
There are always choices in using words, and there is always subjectivity in making choices. In history, the choice of words is unavoidable, and thus, so too is subjectivity. There is no complete objectivity in history, even in the 'simplest' of chronologies.
**A delightful and delightfully German phrase used by the historian Johann Gustav Droysen, in reaction to the ideological austerity and selflessness implied by Leopold von Ranke's emphasis on critical rigour in the use of historical source material.